Introduction
The advancement of digital technologies and widening Internet bandwidth have increased the demand for new multimedia services. Some of the service types include video-on-demand, group discussions, board meetings, etc. There are many users who participate in such services. The communication among the users pertaining to any such service must be carried out confidentially. Other scenarios may be out of the n users in a network, some t(t n) of them would like to discuss on a common concern. These t parties termed privileged users must communicate themselves over a public channel in confidence and others must not be able to listen to the conversation amongst these t parties. Hence, there is a need to find new technology for such confidential communication termed as Secure Group Communication or Secure Conferencing.
A Naive solution is to have a shared key between every pair of users, which leads to storing (n−1) keys with each user. To send a message, sender must encrypt the message to each user in the group separately. This increases the amount of storage at each user-end; computation and communication costs are also increased. Another possible solution would be to have a publicly available directory, called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Here, user will have a (private, public) key pair, private key is known only to that user, whereas public keys of all n users are stored in the publicly available directory. To send a message, sender uses public keys of all other group members to encrypt the message, so that other users can decrypt using their own private keys. This leads to (n−1) encryptions to send a single message and any non-group member can try to act as privileged user and send the message after encrypting it with public keys of privileged users. Since these default solutions require huge amount of storage, communication and computation, they do not fit for group communication scenario. Hence, the general goal of Secure Group Communication is to establish a common secret key, called Secure group key or Secure conference key among privileged users for confidential communication.
Many group key management techniques have been proposed so far. Some schemes are information theoretic in nature and some are complexity theoretic. There may be a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC) involved in the system which generates and distributes initial private pieces of information to users in the group. Group key may be generated and distributed by the KDC or group members may compute the group key, either interactively or non-interactively. Based on the involvement of KDC, key management techniques can be classified into two categories: (i) Key Distribution Scheme and (ii) Contributory Key Agreement Scheme. Key distribution scheme [4, 7, 20, 19, 16, 13, 18] involves a single entity termed as trusted KDC.
There exists a pair-wise secure channel with the KDC and every group member. KDC is responsible for generating and distributing keys to all the members in the group via secure channel. It is also responsible for generating the group key and distributing it to all the users in the group.
In key distribution scheme, after receiving the initial information from KDC, secure group key can be derived by the members in the privileged set, either asynchronously or interactively. In asynchronous mode, each member in the privileged group can derive a common group key on his own for secure conference with the help of information obtained by KDC. In interactive mode, users in the privileged group can communicate with each other to set up secure conference key. However, a KDC incurs management overhead and is a single point of failure.
In contrast to key distribution scheme, contributory key agreement schemes [6, 5, 10, 1, 2, 14, 11] require every group member to contribute an equal share to the common secret key. Secret key for secure group communication is computed as a function of all members contribution.
Once a conference (group key) is set up, users in the group can communicate with each other in secured manner. Since the group is dynamic, membership in the group may change over time, i.e., new members may join the group and existing members may leave the group. Group membership can change because a single member may join/leave the group or a set of members may join/leave the group simultaneously. Set of members join/leave scenario may arise because of the changes in network connectivity. These changes in network connectivity may be due to network partitions (which divides the group) and network re-heals (which combines several groups together 
Key Distribution Schemes
As mentioned earlier, key distribution schemes are classified into asynchronous or non-interactive and interactive modes. In asynchronous mode, each member in the privileged group can derive a common group key on his own, for secure conference, with the help of information obtained by KDC. In interactive mode, users in the privileged group can communicate with each other to compute secure conference key as described below.
Non-interactive Key Distribution Schemes

Blundo et al. Conference Keying Protocol
Blundo et al. [4] have proposed a protocol to derive a common conference key. In this approach, a trusted off line server, which is active only at initial stage, distributes some information among a set of n users, (User 1 , User 2 , . . . , User n ) so that any t of them can join and generate a secure group key asynchronously. Figure   1 
Broadcast Encryption Zero Level Scheme
Fiat and Naor proposed a basic scheme [7] which allows users to determine a common key for every subset, which is resilient to any set S of size ≤ k. In this scheme, for a given k each user is preassigned with a set of keys such that, once the users are told which of them are in privilege set and which are not, each user in the privilege set can construct the common key on his own. This scheme considers a set U which comprises all users i.e., |U| = n. For every set B ⊂ U, 0 ≤ |B| ≤ k, a key K B is defined and K B is given to every user x ∈ U − B. Let T denote the privileged user set. The common secret key to the privileged set T is obtained by performing exclusive-or of all keys K B , B ∈ U − T.
• KDC picks at random a symmetric polynomial P(x 1 , . . . , x t ) of degree k with t variables with coefficients over GF(q), q > n.
, that is the polynomial obtained by evaluating P(x 1 , . . . , x t ) at x 1 = i.
• If the users User j 1 , . . . , User jt want to set up a conference key, then each user
• The conference key for users User j 1 , . . . , User jt is equal to s j 1 ,...,jt = P(j 1 , . . . , j t ). The scheme is resilient to every coalition of up to k users, since, even if up to k users collude, they will all be missing key K S . Hence they are unable to compute the common secret key. In this scheme, each user in the system is assigned
n − 1 i keys and each user is required to perform
operations to obtain the common secret key.
Broadcast Encryption One Level Scheme
This scheme developed by Fiat and Naor [7] , considers a family of functions
. . , m with the property that for every subset S ⊂ U of size k, there exists some 1
that means the family of functions f i contains a perfect hash function (defined in [8] , [12] ) for all size k subsets of U when mapped to the range {1, 2, . . . , m}. This family can be used to obtain a k-resilient scheme from 1-resilient scheme.
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ l and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, an independent 1-resilient scheme R(i, j) is used. Every user u ∈ U receives the keys associated with schemes
Suppose the secret massage is M. To send this message to a privileged set T ⊂ U, KDC generates ran-
KDC broadcasts for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l and 1 ≤ j ≤ m the message M i to the privileged subset {u ∈ T|f i (u) = j} using scheme R(i, j). Every user u ∈ T can obtain all the messages M 1 , . . . , M l and by performing exclusive-or of them can get the message M. Every user receives (n * l) number of keys from KDC where l denotes number of functions, hence the storage required at every user is (n * l) and 3 messages are broadcast by KDC.
Keystone Architecture
This scheme assumes a trusted key server which is responsible for distributing the keys; and, the key server uses key tree [20, 19, 3] for group key management. A key tree is a directed acyclic graph with two types of nodes, U nodes representing members and k nodes representing keys.
The nodes of the tree hold the keys at that particular level. The leaves of the tree correspond to group members and each leaf contains individual key of that member. The key present at the root of the tree is the group key. Key server is at the root of the tree. Keys at the intermediate levels of the tree are termed auxiliary keys and will be used to convey new group key to the members in an efficient manner. A member U is given key k if and only if there is a directed path from U-node u to k-node k in the key path.
If the tree is a balanced binary tree and if there are t users in the group, then the height h of the tree is log 2 t and each member stores at most (h + 1) keys. In general, if d is the degree of the tree and if there are t users, then height of the tree is log d t. Figure 2 depicts a binary tree structure for t = 8 users. K-nodes represent keys and U-nodes represent users. User U 1 , for example, knows the keys K 1 , K 12 , K 14 , and K where K is the group key, K 1 is U 1 's individual key, K 12 and K 14 are auxiliary keys along the path from leaf to root.
For each join/leave operation, server changes keys along the path from leaf to root from the position where join/leave operation has occurred. For example, in Figure 2 , if user U 7 leaves the group, then the keys K 78 , K 58 and K must be changed. Changed group key and auxiliary keys must be conveyed to remaining members in the group. New group key K must be conveyed to users U 1 to U 6 and U 8 , K 58 must be sent to users U 5 , U 6 , U 8 and K 78 to U 8 . The following messages are constructed to convey changed keys:
Similarly, when it joins the group, keys at the same position are to be changed. The following messages are constructed: 
Interactive Key Distribution Schemes
Blundo et al. One-way Interactive Scheme
As in Blundo et al. [4] non-interactive scheme, here also trusted server chooses a symmetric polynomial, but in two variables of degree (k + t − 2) with coefficients over GF(q), q > n. Protocol in Figure 3 realizes an one-time interactive k-secure t-conference key distribution scheme.
The scheme is one-way interactive, since the t th user User t among users (User 1 , User 2 , . . . , User t ) selects the common secret key and sends it securely to all the other t − 1 users (User 1 , User 2 , . . . , User t−1 ). In this scheme, each user is required to store (t + k − 1) elements of GF(q) and is required to perform at the most (k + t − 2) * 2 exponentiations and same number of multiplications and (k + t − 2) additions and one exclusive-or operation. User t sends securely the group key to every other user in the group. Each join/leave operation re-initiates the protocol.
Contributory Key Agreement
Group Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
In this scheme, secret key is never transmitted from one user to the other over the network. Group Diffie-Hellman Protocol in [17] general-1. KDC chooses a symmetric polynomial P(x, y) of degree (k + t − 2) with coefficients over GF(q), q > n.
2. To each user user i , i = 1, . . . , n, in the system, KDC distributes the polynomial f i (y) = P(i, y), that is the polynomial obtained by evaluating P(x, y) at x = i.
3. If the users User j 1 , . . . , User jt , where j 1 < j 2 < . . . < j t , want to set up a conference key, then: (a) User jt , randomly chooses a secret key s in GF(q) (the value s is the conference key).
(b) User jt evaluates the polynomial f jt (y) at y = j l , for l = 1, . . . , t − 1, and, then, he computes temporary keys s jt,j l = f jt (j l ) (which is equal to P(j t , j l )). izes the basic 2 party Diffie-Hellman key exchange discussed in [6] . In Diffie-Hellman, two parties agree on a common key. If a set of k members want to join the group, then a list of partial keys for each member of the group is generated and sent. Upon receiving partial keys each user uses its partial key to compute the common secret key. Usually, one particular member of the group (termed as controller) is responsible for generating and distributing these partial keys. Figure 4 shows a protocol to merge k members to the group and Figure 5 shows a partition protocol.
In merge protocol the current group controller (usually t th user) removes its contribution from the current group key, generates a new token and passes it to one of the new members. The new member adds its own contribution to the token received by group controller and passes the token to the next new member. Every new member (except the last one) adds its own contribution and passes it in the same manner. When the Assume that k members are added to a group of size t.
Step 1: M t generates a new exponent r t ∈ Z q , computes g r 1 ...r t−1 r t mod p, and unicasts the message to M t+1
Step j+1 for j ∈ [1, k − 1]: New merging member M t+j generates an exponent r t+j ∈ Z q , computes g r 1 ...r t ...r t+j mod p and forwards the result to M t+j+1 .
Step k + 1: Upon receipt of the accumulated value, M t+k broadcasts it to the entire group.
Step k + 2: Upon receipt of the broadcast, every member M i , ∀i ∈ [1, t + k − 1], computes g r 1 ...r t ...r t+k /ri mod p and sends it back to M t+k .
Step k + 3: After collecting all the responses M t+k generates a new exponent r t+k , produces the set S = g r 1 ...r t ...r t+k /ri mod p|∀i ∈ [1, t + k − 1] and broadcasts it to the group.
Step k + 4: Upon receiving the broadcast message, every member M i , ∀i ∈ [1, t + k] computes the key K = (g r 1 Assume that a set W of members is leaving a group of size t.
Step 1: The group controller M d generates a new exponent r d ∈ Z q , produces the set S = g r 1 ...r d mod p|M i / ∈ W, and broadcasts it to the remaining members in the group.
Step 2: Upon receiving S, every remaining member M i , ∀i / ∈ W computes the key token reaches the last new member, it broadcasts the token to the group without adding its contribution. From now on, this becomes the new group controller. Upon receiving the token, every group member (including new members), removes (factors out) its contribution and sends it to the new group controller (last new member). After receiving this information from all the members, new controller adds its own contribution to each and this represents a partial key. After computing all the partial keys, it is broadcast to the group. Every member gets the new group key by adding its contribution to the corresponding partial key that was broadcast.
In partition protocol, when a set of members leave the group, the most recent remaining group member is termed as the group controller. Group controller removes the corresponding partial keys of the leaving users from the list of partial keys, adds its new contribution after removing the previous contribution and broadcasts it to the group. Each remaining member in the group can compute the secret group key by adding its own contribution to the corresponding partial key in the list. For every join operation, (t + 3) messages are sent and each user must perform (t + 3) exponentiation operations. If any user leaves the group, one message is broadcast and each user performs one exponentiation operation, hence totally (t − 1) exponentiation operations are performed.
Burmester-Desmedt Scheme
Burmester and Desmedt proposed a protocol [5] which is very efficient and executes in only three rounds. Figure 6 shows the BurmesterDesmedt protocol. The same protocol is executed irrespectively of the type of membership change (i.e, whether it is join or leave). This scheme does not involve any group controller, computation is distributed among members of the group. Users U 1 through U t with individual Diffie-Hellman exponentials z i = g ri will form a conference key K = g r 1 r 2 +r 2 r 3 +...+r t−1 rt . Every user is required to perform (t + 1) exponentiations and (t − 1) multiplications and must broadcast (2 * t) messages.
If any user joins the group, (2 * t + 2) messages are broadcast and 3 exponentiation operations are performed. For a leave operation, (2 * t − 2) messages are broadcast and 3 exponentiation operations are performed.
Any group of t ≤ n users (U 1 , . . . , U t ) (t n), derive a common group key K as follows: (Every user U i is aware of other t − 1 members in the group) 1. Each U i selects a random integer r i , 1 ≤ r i ≤ p − 2, computes z i = g ri mod p, and sends z i to each of the other t − 1 group members.
2. Each U i after receiving z i−1 and z i+1 , computes X i = (z i+1 /z i−1 ) ri mod p (i.e., X i = g r i+1 ri−rir i−1 ), and sends X i to each of the other t − 1 group members. 
Upon receiving
X j , 1 ≤ j ≤ t excluding j = i, U i computes K = K i as K i = (z i−1 ) tri .X t−1 i .X t−2 i+1 . . . X 2 i+(t+3) .X 1 i+(t−2) mod p = g
Classification
The schemes discussed above are deliberately classified based on the factors like (i) method used to establish the group key (ii) role of Key Distribution Center and (iii) security.
Based on Group Key Establishment
Based on the way group key is derived, the schemes can be classified into (a) Key Distribution scheme (b) Contributory Key Agreement scheme. In key distribution scheme, as we saw earlier, there is a key distribution center which is responsible for generating and distributing keys to all the group members via secure channel. KDC also generates and distributes initial group key to the group members when the group is set up and also new group key whenever there is a membership change (join/leave). Again the schemes which come under Key Distribution can be further classified into Asynchronous or Non-Interactive and Interactive Key Distribution schemes. In Non-Interactive, members in the privileged group can derive a common group key on their own with the help of the information obtained by KDC. Of the schemes discussed so far, Blundo et al. conference keying protocol [4] , Broadcast encryption zero level and one level schemes [7] , and Keystone architecture scheme [21] are Non-interactive Key Distribution schemes.
In Interactive, users in the privileged group can communicate with each other to set up the group key. Blundo et al. one-way interactive scheme [4] comes under this classification, as t th user is choosing the group key and distributing it securely to the rest of the (t − 1) members in the group.
In Contributory Key Agreement schemes, there is no KDC involved. Instead, each group member picks its own contribution (maybe some random number) to group key and interacts with other members to compute the group key. Schemes proposed by Diffie-Hellman [6, 17] and Burmester-Desmedt [5] come under this scheme. [4] and Broadcast encryption zero level schemes [7] come under this category. Where as in Broadcast encryption one level scheme [7] and Keystone architecture [21] , KDC is active throughout the protocol. During initial stage, KDC generates and distributes securely initial private pieces of information among the privileged user set. During later stage, it becomes active during each join/leave operation. In broadcast encryption one level scheme, KDC itself generates random strings for the message and broadcasts it to the privileged set, where as in keystone architecture, whenever there is a membership change (join/leave), KDC generates new group key and auxiliary keys and sends them to the group members in an optimized way.
Based on Role of KDC
Based on Security
Group key management schemes provide either unconditional security or conditional security. In unconditional security, even if an adversary has unlimited computational resources, he cannot defeat the system. In conditional security, depending on the amount of computational effort required, an adversary can defeat the system and the methods depend on the hardness of the problem. The following schemes provide unconditional security: Blundo et al. noninteractive and one way interactive schemes [4] , Broadcast encryption zero level and one level schemes [7] , keystone architecture [21] . Where as the schemes proposed by Diffie-Hellman [6] and Burmester-Desmedt [5] provide conditional security. Table 1 depicts storage, communication and computation costs at each user during key set up activity for the above discussed Key management schemes. This is considered after initial information is distributed to all the n users and after knowing the privileged user set, i.e., participating t members. In the table, n denotes total number of users in the system, t denotes size of the privileged set, k denotes the threshold and L total number of functions.
Storage, Computation and Communication costs
Let the number of users in the system, n be 30, size of the privileged set t be 10 and threshold value k be 3. For Blundo et al. non-interactive, one-way interactive, Broadcast encryption zero level and one level schemes, we have considered the size of the element from GF(q) as 64-bits and for Group Diffie-Hellman, BurmesterDesmedt and Keystone architecture schemes, the size of the element is considered as 1024-bits. Table 2 shows the storage and communication costs in bits and total computation cost in bit-operations for different protocols after considering one join and one leave operations. If one member joins the group, size of the privileged set will be (t + 1) i.e., 11 and if a member leaves, it is (t − 1) i.e., 9. First row of each protocol indicates the storage, communication and computation costs during initial key set up activity.
Each exponentiation and multiplication operation requires Wlog 2 W bit-operations, where W is the size of the element. It is 64 log 2 64 = 384 bit-operations for the protocols for which W = 64 and 1024 log 2 1024 = 10240 bit-operations for the protocols with W = 1024.
Calculations Illustration:
Consider Blundo et al. non-interactive scheme.
Storage at each user is k + t − 2 t − 2 = 11 8 = 165 co-efficients from GF(q). Size of each co-efficient is considered as 64-bits, hence storage at each user = 165 * 64 = 10560 bits. Each term contains maximum 10 variables (t) with maximum degree 3 (k). Therefore, maximum number of exponentiations = 10 * 3 = 30.
Number of Multiplications
= t * k + t − 2 t − 2 = 10 * 165 = 1650 Number of Additions = k + t − 2 t − 2 = 165
Protocol Storage Required Communication Cost Computation Cost
Blundo et al.
Multiplications, Total computation cost for Exponentiation, Multiplication and Addition = (30 + 1650) * 384 + 165 * 64 = 655680 bit-operations.
For every join/leave operation, the protocol must be restarted (i.e., KDC must pick another symmetric polynomial and distribute it) from the initial stage. For join operation, every user will have 12 9 = 220 coefficients and is required to perform 11 * 3 exponentiation operations, 2420 multiplications and 220 additions. Total storage is 220 * 64 = 14080 bits and computation cost is (33 + 2420) * 384 + 220 * 64 = 956032 bit-operations. If a user leaves the group, storage = 120 * 64 = 7680 bits and computation cost = (27 + 1080) * 384 + 120 * 64 = 432768 bit-operations.
For Diffie-Hellman protocol, each user must store only the random number whose size we have considered as 1024-bits. During initial group key set up, totally t * (2 t−1 + 1) messages are exchanged among privileged user set. Hence, communication cost = 10 * (2 9 + 1) = 5130 messages * 1024 bits = 52, 53, 120 bits. Each user must perform 2 t−1 + 1 exponentiations, which leads to 2 9 + 1 = 513 exponentiations with 10240 bit-operations for each exponentiation. So, total exponentiation cost = 513 * 10240 = 52, 53, 120 bit-operations.
If a user joins the group, only (t + 3) messages are sent and (t+3) exponentiation operations are performed. Hence, total communication cost is 13, 312 bits and computation cost is 1, 33, 120 bit-operations. For a leave operation, only one message is sent (1024bits) and (t−1) exponentiation operations are performed i.e., computation cost = 9 * 10240 = 92, 160 bit-operations.
Performance Analysis
In Blundo et al. non-interactive scheme and broadcast encryption zero level scheme, amount of storage required at each user and the computation costs are larger, but there is no communication among the group members. In Blundo et al. one-way interactive scheme, amount of storage required is very much less, compared to non-interactive scheme and it requires moderate computation cost with minimum communication cost. Broadcast encryption one level scheme requires moderate amount of storage with less communication and computation costs. In keystone architecture, no computation cost is involved since KDC itself sends the group key. In Group Diffie-Hellman, storage required is negligible, but requires more messages to be exchanged with high computation cost. Burmester-Desmedt scheme requires more stor- age; communication and computation costs are also high to set up the group key, but, computation cost required is less for join/leave operations as compared to Diffie-Hellman, Broadcast encryption zero level and Blundo et al. noninteractive schemes. Graphs depicting number of users versus storage, communication and computation costs are plotted. Figure 7 gives the comparison for amount of storage at each user and Figure 8 about communication and computation costs. From the graphs we can see that amount of storage required for DiffieHellman is negligible, but communication and computation costs are too high.
For join/leave operations, the schemes proposed by Blundo et al. and broadcast encryption zero level schemes require almost the same amount of computation as required for initial key set up, where as it is very much less in case of Diffie-Hellman and Burmester-Desmedt protocols. Among the protocols discussed in the paper, broadcast encryption one level and keystone architecture schemes are quite efficient as compared with other schemes.
Conclusion
We discussed several key management schemes and classified them based on the method used to establish the group key, involvement of Key Distribution Center in different phases of secure group communication and security factors. We analyzed the performance of the protocols based on the amount of storage required, communication and computation costs during initial key set up activity and during join/leave operations. It is evident from the tables that the schemes which require more storage, require less amount of communication. But, at the same time, computation cost required for join/leave operations is quite high. The schemes which require more communication among users, require less amount of computation for each join/leave operation.
